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ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM 
BASED ON THE HURST EXPONENT
Sergei Semenov, Svetlana Gavrilenko, Victor Chelak.
Abstract: The method of identifying abnormal behavior of computer systems based on the Hurst exponent is 
examined in this report.  Results of the research suggest the possibility of using the Hurst exponent for identifying 
the anomalous behavior of computer systems in the overall system to detect malicious software. 
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1. Introduction
Today cyberthreats are developing actively, and 
understanding the direction of this development 
plays a key role in providing enterprises’ effective 
security. If viruses aren’t identified at early stages, 
the costs of recovery after the attack increase by 
more than twofold. For example, the total cost of 
recovery after a cyber-attack lasting a week or more 
amounted to over $ 1 million. At the same time, 
the immediate response to the incident cost the 
company an average of 400 thousand dollars. [1].
 
To date, there is a large number of different 
antivirus programs, the basis of which is most 
often based on signature and heuristic analysis 
technologies [2]. Data on threats is collected from 
a variety of sources, including cloud infrastructure, 
search robots, botnet monitoring services, spam 
traps. New cyber threats are determined by check-
ing URLs, domains, IP addresses, checksums of 
files, timestamps, file names, DNS data and other 
characteristics inherent in the programs. The re-
ceived information is carefully checked, organized, 
cleaned and analyzed both with the help of heuristic 
analysis tools and by the analysts of the company 
developing antivirus software [3].
Heuristic analyzers, as a rule, include intellec-
tual subsystems based on the theory of artificial 
intelligence, for example, on the basis of methods 
of fuzzy logic, cluster analysis, coordinated heuris-
tics or the theory of neural networks [4-8]. At the 
same time, they are all based on the assumption that 
the computer systems (CS) have their own pattern 
of normal behavior and any significant deviations 
from it may be due to the impact of intruders. That 
is why a very important task is the choice or for-
mation of such a template that would reproduce the 
functional portrait of the CS and fix its anomalous 
behavior with a given accuracy.
The analysis of the literature showed that meth-
ods of statistical data processing (for example, 
control cards, BDS testing [5-6]) are widely used 
to detect anomalies in production management 
and business processes. To justify the prediction 
of trends, in natural sciences, the Hurst exponent 
is often used to identify new characteristics of the 
process. [7-12]
2. Development of methods for 
detecting intrusions in computer 
systems based on the Hurst index
The Hurst exponent was first used by the out-
standing British hydrologist Harold Edwin Hurst 
when designing a dam on the Nile in Egypt to 
assess the inflow and outflow of water [7]. Hurst, 
having studied the records of the floods of the Nile 
for nine centuries, found regularity in this process. 
He proved the possibility of distinguishing a ran-
dom series from a non-random one, even if the 
random series is not normally distributed, linking 
it to the degree of self-similarity of the process. An 
object that has this "quality" is statistically similar 
in different scales - spatial or temporal, that is, it 
has a cyclicity.
The calculation of the Hurst exponent [12] can 
be performed using the following formula (1):
 (1)
Where:
H is the Hurst exponent;
S is the standard deviation of a set of observa-
tions x;
R is the range of the accumulated deviation Zu;
N is the number of observation periods;
A is a given constant, a positive number.
 (2)
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where Хa – is the arithmetical mean of a set of 
observations х in N periods
 (3)
The range of the accumulated deviation R is the 
most important element of the formula for calcu-
lating the Hurst index. In general, it is calculated 
as follows:
   (4)
Zu is the accumulated deviation of set х from 
the average Хa:
 (5)
The Hurst exponent (H) characterizes the de-
gree of self-similarity of the process as follows 
[11-12]:
1) 0 <H <0.5 is a random process that does 
not have self-similarity and is characterized by a 
tendency toward an average value;
2) H = 0.5 is a completely random process 
without a pronounced tendency;
3) H> 0.5 is a trend-based process that has a 
long memory and is self-similar.
From the formula for calculating the Hurst 
exponent, it can be seen that its growth is influ-
enced by:
- increase in the range of the R oscillations;
- reduction of the root-mean-square error S;
- decrease in the number of observations of N.
In this paper, the possibility of fixing the abnor-
mal behavior of a computer system (CS) based on 
the Hurst exponent is analyzed.
It is known that the abnormal behavior of the 
operation of computer systems is characterized by 
excessive consumption of system resources, such 
as RAM, traffic, CPU utilization, increases the 
number of received and transmitted data packets.
In the course of the study, it was decided to use 
the central processor (CPU) as input data.
To carry out the research, a software model has 
been developed that provides for the variation of 
N - the number of time series values. The value of 
the CPU load is scanned every second and saved 
in a file.
The received input values are fed into the input 
of the analysis module, which processes the data 
and calculates the Hurst exponent.
Fig. 1 shows the curve of the relation between 
the set of values log (R / S) to log (aN) of the CPU 
load and the result of calculation of the Hurst 
exponent for infection by the virus type VirKP55
As can be seen from Fig. 1, the Hurst exponent 
indicates the randomness of the process, which 
does not have self-similarity and is characterized 
by a desire for an average value.
Similar results were obtained when the system 
was infected with other types of viruses. Fig. 2 
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The Hurst exponent, H  = 0.414775 ± 0,125261 
Fig. 1. The curve of the relation between log (R/S)  to   log( aN)  of the CPU load and the result of calculation of 
the Hurst exponent for infection by the virus type VirKP55
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shows the result of modeling when a virus is in-
fected with a virus type VirMask.
The results of analyzing the operation of a 
computer system in safe mode are of interest. Fig. 
3 shows one of the results of research and calcu-
lation of the Hurst index, as well as a graph of the 
dependence of the numerical load range of the 
CPU in safe mode. Analysis of the graph (Figure 
3) shows the presence of long-term dependencies 
in statistical data.
Fig. 2. The curve of the relation between log (R/S)    to   log( aN) of the CPU load and the result  
of calculation of the Hurst exponent for infection by the virus type VirMask
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Hurst exponent, H  = 0.406405±  0.124816 
Fig. 3. The curve of the relation between log (R/S)    to   log( aN)   
of the CPU load in safe mode of a CS
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Hurst exponent, H  =  0.812745±  0.289510 
122
3. Conclusion
The results of the research showed:
1. Under the impact of malicious software on 
the computer system, the statistical indicators of 
the main parameters of the system functioning 
(CPU load, RAM, etc.) change.
2. The impact of a number of viruses on the 
computer system leads to a change in the Hurst 
exponent, which indicates the randomness of the 
process, which does not have self-similarity and 
is characterized by a tendency toward an average 
value of 0.5.
3. It should be noted that one of the shortcom-
ings of the proposed method for identifying the 
state of CS is a large (in some cases up to 0.4) 
deviation from the average value of the fractal di-
mension and Hurst. Therefore, in order to improve 
the accuracy of the structural identification of the 
state, it is necessary to use other methods of state 
identification, (control cards, BDS testing, etc.) 
along with the method considered.
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